This article engages critically with an emergent rhetoric suggesting that Member States and trade unions seeking to apply their domestic social standards to foreign service providers, in the context of what EU lawyers refer to as 'Free movement of Services', engage in practices amounting to economic protectionism. To countervail this rhetoric, the paper revisits some of the regulatory principles and rationales underpinning the law on 'Free Movement of Workers' and draws a number of parallels between them and the principles that regulate, or ought to regulate, other freedoms that de facto involve the free circulation of working persons in Europe, albeit under the guise of 'Free movement of Services' or 'Freedom of Establishment'. It asserts that all market freedoms affecting the free movement rights of working persons in Europe, ought to be regulated by reference to what the paper describes as the 'Equal treatment Principle' and distance themselves from any 'Country of Origin' rationale.
dismissal', 3 a fact that is widely accepted and has never given rise to any protectionist claims. We believe, and the article will argue, that some services that are particularly labour intensive (such as those typically associated with the construction, caring, or security services sectors), or particularly personal, in that they are provided personally or mainly personally by sole-entrepreneurs, or self-employed persons without employees, ought to be regulated on the basis of the rules and rationales applying to the free movement of workers, and in particular by reference to what the article refers to as the 'Equal Treatment Principle' (ETP).
In order to advance this claim, the article revisits, and at times engages critically with, two fairly consolidated orthodoxies in EU free movement law, which in our view have underpinned and reinforced the status quo that this article engages critically and normatively with. The first orthodoxy, or dominant view, is that only one of the fundamental free movement rights protected by the Treaties, that is to say free movement of workers, deals with the rights of EU citizens to move to another EU Member State (EU MS) for work related purposes. To quote a recent EU Commission document 'Freedom of movement for workers is one of the four fundamental freedoms on which the Single Market is based. … Article 45 TFEU enshrines the right of EU citizens to move to another Member State for work purposes'. 4 Free movement of workers is no doubt one of, and even the main, Treaty freedom regulating the rights of EU citizens to pursue work related activities in other MS, but there is a tendency to overstate its role and forget that 'freedom of establishment' (FES) and 'freedom to provide services' (FMS) are also important vehicles to that effect.
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The second dominant view that we seek to engage with is that the law regulating the main EU free movement rights, that is to say the law interpreting the TFEU provisions dealing with free movement of workers (FMW, under Article 45), the right of establishment (FES, Article 49), and free movement of services (FMS, Article 56), is inexorably converging towards a 'market access' (MA) test where all freedoms are interpreted in a parallel if not identical way. 6 There is no denying that the interpretation of the EU fundamental market freedoms has been converging towards 'market access'. 7 But we fear that by emphasising the common threads of this convergence process, EU law is beginning to overlook some minute, but very important, differences in the way in which the relationship between Host MSs and Home MSs regulatory standards is squared across the four freedoms, and in particular the residual but extremely critical role of the Equal Treatment Principle (ETP) in the free movement of workers context in particular.
This article seeks to elaborate on the three interlinked issues introduced above -the false 'protectionism v protection' dilemma, 'free movement of workers' as the seemingly exclusive vehicle for EU citizens to move to other MS for work purposes, and the hegemonic role of 'market access' -through four separate but interlinked steps, appearing below in the four following sections. Section 2 below, briefly explores 'free movement of workers' and the continuing relevance of the ETP in this area of EU law, in spite of the presence of the 'market access' principle. This is then followed, in section 3, by an analysis of the law on the FES of natural persons (FES/NP), where we discuss the extent to which some of the ETP elements explored in the previous parts have been increasingly overshadowed by a strong 'market access' principle that tends to prioritize the rules of the country of origin of the service provider over the rules of the Host Member state. Section 4 carries out a similar analysis in respect of 'free movement of services', particularly by reference to the case law on the posting of workers under Directive 96/71, 8 and concludes that the ETP is completely marginalised in this area of EU law, which is almost entirely dominated by a 'Country of Origin Principle' (COP) 9 that was, in our view, never intended to have such a hegemonic role.
Section 5 brings the many threads of the article together in order to reassess the 'protection v protectionist' dilemma in light of the normative suggestion advanced in the article, that is to say that if one is willing to embrace some of the less obvious similarities existing between some areas of 'free movement of services' and 'freedom of establishment of natural persons' and 'free movement of workers', the dilemma, and the rhetoric underpinning it, quickly dissolves.
Free Movement of Workers and the ETP
As noted above there is an area of EU free movement law that, in our view and in the view of many, is fundamentally shaped by the ETP, namely the area of 'free movement of workers' (FMW). By 'fundamentally' we mean that ETP is the foundational principle underpinning the freedom of EU workers to 'access' and 'participate' in the labour markets of EU MSs other than their own. Not only is the ETP the dominant regulatory principle of 'free movement of persons' but, we will go on to suggest, it is considered as the normative cornerstone of this area of EU law, enjoying a degree of cogency that few other EU legal principles have. This degree of cogency has only increased since the emergence of the notion of European citizenship in the 'free movement of workers/persons' context, a notion that is in many ways founded on the ETP. We believe that at a normative level ETP plays, or ought to play, an equally central role as far as freedom of establishment of (natural) persons (FES/NP) is concerned. 10 Admittedly in both areas of law, and perhaps more visibly in FES/NP, the application of the ETP has recently become more nuanced and partly concealed by the growing hegemonic role of the 'market access' principle. 11 But, while this shift does pose some challenging questions to our argument, we would maintain that, in spite of this move, the ETP has anything but disappeared. In this section we start by outlining briefly the relevance, role, and rationales of the ETP, its relationship with the MA and COP concepts, and argue in favour of its suitability as the key regulatory principle in the 'free movement of workers' context.
In the 'free movement of workes' context, the ETP receives a broad recognition as a fundamental principle from primary and secondary sources alike. It is strongly anchored to the 'non-discrimination' principle contained in Treaty provisions and 'entail[s] the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment', 12 with the ECJ clarifying that it 'prohibits not only overt discrimination … but all covert forms of discrimination which … in fact achieve the same result'. 13 This has long been reflected in EU secondary legislation, with old Reg. 1612/68 providing that EU workers 'may not, in the territory of another Member State, be treated differently from national workers by reason of his nationality in respect of any conditions of employment and work, in particular as regards remuneration'.
14 So, to begin with, the ETP imposes a strong 'non-discrimination' requirement on EU Member States but, and this is a crucial contention in our argument -and one which we further develop below in subsection 2.b -also goes beyond a de minimis notion of non-discrimination by requiring a Host MS to apply to EU migrant workers its domestic rules exclusively and exhaustively, that is to say while effectively disregarding any labour standards of the workers' country of origin.
The development of the EU citizenship concept, and the adoption of the Citizenship Directive, have arguable reinforced the ETP in the 'free movement of workers' context by strengthening its 'non-discrimination' dimension and, we will contend in the next section, ought to have expanded it to the broader area of free movement of persons, including to 'self-employed persons', since most Free Movement rights included in the Directive apply equally to 'workers or self-employed persons'. 15 The ECJ famously posited in Martinez Sala that 'the Treaty attaches to the status of citizen of the Union the rights and duties laid down by the Treaty, including the right … not to suffer discrimination on grounds of nationality'.
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Unsurprisingly Part Two of the TFEU refers to 'Non-discrimination and Citizenship of the Union' making an 'express linkage between the prohibition on nationality discrimination, action to combat other forms of discrimination, and the primary rights of EU citizenship'. We should note that EU law is not the only legal system which includes a principle of equal treatment for migrant workers. For instance both ILO conventions dealing with migrant workers expressly contain provisions regarding equal treatment. Article 6 of Convention No 97 stipulates that members for which the convention is in force undertake to apply to immigrants lawfully within their territory treatment no less favourable than that which is applies to their own nationals in respect to e.g. remuneration, hours of work, paid holidays, memberships of trade unions and enjoyments of the benefits of collective bargaining. Part II of Convention No 143 goes further, requiring not only the repeal of statutory provisions or administrative practices that are discriminatory, but the positive action by the public authorities to promote equality of opportunity and treatment in practice. As we will discuss further in the conclusion of this article, under Article 19(4) of the Council of Europe´s European Social Charter (Revised) the parties undertake to secure for 'workers lawfully within their territories' treatment 'not less favourable than that of their own nationals' in respect of e.g. remuneration and other employment and working conditions, membership of trade unions and the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining. An important difference between these provisions and Article 19 TFEU is of course that the latter only applies to EU citizens, excluding third country nationals. 18 Finally, and going back to the EU legal order, it is worth recalling the private international law approach endorsed by Articles 8 and 9 of the Rome I Regulations (RIR) 19 in the case of 'individual employment contracts'.
While Article 8 embraces, in the first instance, a 'choice of law' approach and, failing that, a COP approach, Article 9 provides that, 'irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract', any 'overriding mandatory provision' will have to be applied. As noted by Merret, 'This provision is particularly important in employment cases because the statutory employment rights granted to employees are 'mandatory rules'. 20 Barnard rightly notes that both the RIR and its predecessor the Rome Convention 1980, 'appears to endorse this position in respect of migrant workers and possibly in respect of posted workers', thoughas it will be discussed below -'the Posted Workers Directive […] casts serious doubt on the territorial application of national labour law to posted workers', 21 and in her work aptly contrasts the 'labour law perspective' traditionally adopted under the Rome Convention, with the 'single market' approach currently endorsed by the CJEU.
a. The rationale of the 'equal treatment principle' in the 'free movement of workers' context There are a number of justifications explaining the dominant role of the 'equal treatment principle' (ETP) in the 'free movement of workers' (FMW) context. Some of them are economic or political while some others are more principled in nature. To begin with, the ETP has been both an economic and political precondition for the introduction and functioning of FMW, and the common market at large. To borrow the words used in the 1956 Spaak Report the ETP was one of the 'conditions économiques générales qui permettront ouvrir largement les portes aux travailleurs' in that 'if on the one hand, every discrimination between national workers and immigrant workers is effectively prohibited, and if, on the other, either by the law of the State, or through the action of trade unions, any kind of fall of wages is in principle excluded, the employers will have no incentive to request more migrant labour force than what is actually needed to fill the available vacancies. In this way, any pressure on the level of wages is avoided and the labour market tends to adjust by itself'.
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Thus the ETP was right from the beginning of the process of European integration a precondition for the process itself, in that it made sure that the functioning of the host MSs labour market would not suffer any significant distortion as the consequence of an increase in the supply of migrant labour. Of course, as the quote above reminds us, the precondition to the precondition was that the law of the State and trade union action had to uphold the ETP. 23 At the same time, the ETP serves to support the mandatory nature of host MS labour law. So, to sum up, strong labour market institutions and the ETP were almost seen as an economic and political precondition to free movement of workers.
The ETP also has a strong dignitarian justification, further corroborated by the recognition of the concept of equality as a general principle of EU law, and of the concept of nondiscrimination as the main building block of EU Citizenship. We are all familiar with the assertion by the Court that 'the economic aim pursued by Article [157] of the Treaty, namely the elimination of distortions of competition between undertakings established in different Member States, is secondary to the social aim pursued by the same provision, which constitutes the expression of a fundamental human right'. 24 This line of reasoning applies not just to the sphere of sex equality, but to the ETP in general, and the ETP in the free movement of workers context in particular. As noted by McCrudden and Prechal 'While equality and non-discrimination, in particular non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, began as a means of securing market integration, by now it has also become a method to deliver social policies. Relatively early in the case law of the ECJ, in particular in cases involving individuals, the nexus between economic integration and non-discrimination has been weakened in the sense that social considerations have also been taken on board'
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To put it in simple words, just as it is offensive to a woman's dignity to receive a lower salary than a man for doing 'work of equal value' so is offensive to a migrant worker's dignity to receive a lower pay than a domestic one for doing the same job. 28 In our attempt to address this point we will develop a number of arguments that seek to advance the descriptive claim that, in the 'free movement of workers' field at least, the 'market access' principle does not necessarily posit a radical departure from the ETP, as admittedly it appears to have done in other contexts, and in particular in the 'free movement of services' context. 29 In the following section 3, we will also suggest that much of what we advance in respect of 'free movement of workers' also applies to the freedom of establishment of natural persons, although admittedly in this area of free movement the Court of Justice's jurisprudence has sought to dismantle some Host-state non-discriminatory measures much more vigorously, thus pulling 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' more forcefully towards a 'country of origin principle' (COP) approach.
First and foremost, the introduction of the MA test in the 'free movement of workers' (FMW) field has not, in our view, displaced the 'equal treatment principle' (ETP). If a discriminatory measure were to be in place in the host member state it would equally engage the ETP and the MA test, in fact it would engage the latter a fortiori (since a discriminatory measure would a fortiori cause a hindrance to MA). The 'access test' lowers the threshold where a domestic measure is likely to be caught by EU law, but certainly does not remove the ETP from the FMW regulatory equation. So at a basic level, 'market access' is not incompatible with the ETP, but actually builds on it. Secondly we feel we can confute the suggestion that the MA test is inherently linked to the nemesis of the ETP, the 'country of origin principle'. This is not just because ultimately, non-discriminatory measures hindering market access are always susceptible to a relatively broad range of justification, 30 nor is it because of the more cautious approach adopted by the Court in Graf. 31 At a deeper level however, the emergence of a 'market access' test may be seen as challenging our argument in a different way. It could be argued that 'market access' also engages national labour standards of the host MS that, while non-discriminatory in law or practice, act as a barrier to the entry of foreign workers by restricting their freedom to sell their labour through contracts or relationships contemplating terms and conditions of employment that, while in line with their 'country of origin' standards, fall below the ones prevailing in the host MS. Here the ETP is implicitly approached as a minimalistic nondiscrimination obligation for the employer/Host MSs, and one that the worker ought to be able to opt-out from under EU law for the sake of market access. This is a hypothetical scenario so far unaddressed by the Court of Justice, but, ex hypothesis this could be applied to the situation of, say, a Greek university lecturer who is so keen to find a better source of income that she may be willing to move to, say, Stockholm, and work as an employee of the University of Stockholm for less than the level of pay set for equally qualified and senior Swedish academic lecturers by the relevant Swedish collective agreement. 34 The one million
Krona question under the MA test is, should the collective agreement be set aside for her sake (and the sake of 'market access')? Or should the 'equal treatment principle' prevail in the sense that the terms of the collective agreement ought to be applied to her (even enforced against her) as to any comparable Swedish worker? Despite recent case law in the area of services, it is highly implausible that the CJEU would consider the scenario described here, or say the high minimum wage in one country or lower weekly working times, as an unjustifiable barrier to 'free movement of workers' (and indeed as a barrier to 'free movement of workers' tout court). The answer to the question would probably not be affected by the duration of the Greek academic stay in Sweden either. Even a worker providing her labour for just a few weeks, say under a short fixed term contract, would be captured by the ETP. We should reiterate that although we are advancing this analysis of EU law as the descriptively correct one, it must be pointed out that, given the absence of any precedent elaborating on this set of issue, we are talking both de jure condito (in that we do not think that Bosman would require setting aside the collective agreement in question) and, to a certain extent, de jure condendo, in that the Court had yet to adjudicate on a reference where the worker posited that the Host State's higher labour standards operated as a restriction to her 'free movement of workers' rights.
We should note that, in the realities of labour markets, the link between being allowed to work for wages and at working conditions below those commonly applied in the host MS and market access is not as direct as one could think in abstract. Individuals are often willing to adapt and to sacrifice pay or seniority for the purposes of, say, working closer to home, or moving to a different, new workplace that offers better career prospects in the longer run, or more job satisfaction. These strategies are also used by foreign workers who wish to penetrate the labour markets, e.g. through applying for less senior positions. This is fully compatible with the 'equal treatment principle' and has little to do with the 'market access'
33 The 'compensation' rule being a French rule imposed against a French player seeking to exit his Home MS to sign a contract with a UK football team. 34 It should be noted at this point that Swedish law allows trade unions and employers to enter into collective agreements (and the use collective action on either side to persuade the other to sign such agreements) and that employers are typically obliged to apply the collective agreement to all employees.
test. The employer -once the decision about the appointment is made -would not be able to treat the foreign worker less favourably than the domestic one, precisely by reference to the standards on domestic labour sources, be they statutory or collective.
3. Freedom of Establishment of natural persons, the 'equal treatment principle' and 'market access'. While, in our view, 'free movement of workers' (FMW) remains fairly stably anchored in the 'equal treatment principle' (ETP), the situation regarding the freedom of establishment of natural persons (FES/NP), is admittedly more complex. We try to assess the extent to which FES/NP remains influenced by the ETP but our analysis of the case law concedes that this area of EU Free Movement law is increasingly drifting away from the ETP and has been attracted quite visibly within the sphere of influence of the 'country of origin principle' (COP), in a way that -in our view -is at odds with what we see are the original rationale and role of the ETP in the 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' context. a. The rationale of the 'equal treatment principle' in the 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' context
In arguing this point, we need to begin by acknowledging that in the early years of European integration, the treatment of the self-employed (in the context of freedom of establishment) may not have been perfectly aligned to that applicable to workers under 'free movement of workers' law. In fact the Spaak Report sought to 'distinguish free movement of workers from the free movement of persons exercising independent professions', which appeared to its authors as more 'closely linked to [the provisions] of services', 35 but for the fact that, presumably, the latter are by their nature temporary in character. This close link is partly still reflected in the way the Treaty, in Article 62 TFEU, applies the exceptions to freedom of establishment to the freedom of services context.
But it seems to us that, in other crucial aspects, the regulation of freedom of establishment of persons exercising independent professions has been decoupled from that of services and has been more closely, albeit not fully, aligned to that of 'free movement of workers' and to the 'eqaul treatment principle'. The Court, in cases like Konstantinidis has clarified that national rules applying to the exercise and provision of self-employed activities would be caught by EU law when they place a foreign self-employed worker 'at a disadvantage in law or in fact, in comparison with the way in which a national of that Member state would be treated in the same circumstances'. 36 Perhaps most importantly, with the adoption of the State'. Arguably over the years we have seen a growing -and fully justifiable -conceptual (and regulatory) separation between the sources regulating the freedom of establishment of natural persons, and the self-employed in particular, and that of legal persons, with the former category being progressively approximated to the 'free movement of workers' regulatory scheme, at least in EU secondary legislation such as Directive 2004/38, and to a certain extent in provisions such as Article 15(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (which crucially also refers to 'citizens [that] provide services'). A number of EC/EU secondary instruments introduced to regulate particular categories of 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' beneficiaries, have also sought to align more markedly their treatment to that of workers by reference to the application of Host Member State rules, and to the exclusions of the 'country of origin principle'. For instance, as noted by Wyatt, 'national rules requiring registration with an appropriate trade or professional body are presumptively not applicable to those providing services, but applicable to those established in the Member State in question'. 38 We feel that this separation of 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' from 'free movement of services' in general is a welcome development, in that it recognises that the personal provision of a certain service, especially when that provision is of a stable and continuous nature, ought to be regulated along the lines of 'free movement of workers' and its underlying rationales. On the other hand, while the legislative institutions of the EU have, in our view, sought to approximate the free movement rights of self-employed professionals to the ones of dependent workers, the CJEU's jurisprudence has instigated an opposite jurisprudential dynamic whereby the regulation of 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' is increasingly, though in our view not systematically or coherently, aligned to the 'country of origin principle', a point that we will further elaborate on below in subsection b.
b. Freedom of establishment of (natural) persons and the rise of MA This subsection seeks to elaborate further on the precise location of freedom of establishment of (natural) persons on the ETP-COP spectrum, mostly by reference to the Court's analysis of the impact that non-discriminatory Host MS's professional standards on the establishment of persons exercising independent professions. In a way we are trying to find an answer to the equivalent 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' hypothetical scenario discussed in the last paragraph of the previous section 2, in the context of free movement of workers (the Greek university lecturer moving to Sweden scenario). We ought to note that, in a number of MSs, self-employed professionals are generally allowed to compete on price in the provision of their services, and minimum wage legislation does normally not apply to them. However, many Member States still regulate, to various extents, the activities of self-employed workers, particularly in such matters as occupational health and safety, 39 but also, as the recent Konstantinides 40 dispute reminds us, in respect of the charges that they are allowed to apply to customers or clients.
For the purpose of our present enquiry, this hypothetical scenario or question could be structured in the following terms. Could a German professional seeking to establish herself (as opposed to offer temporary services under 'free movement of services' arrangement) in MS X argue that the (non-discriminatory) professional tariffs or fees introduced by the relevant national professional body of the Host MS hinder her access to the market, and that she should be free to either 'undersell' or 'overprice' her personal work or services for the sake of market penetration/access? We will see that the answer to this question differs, in our view somewhat unexplainably, from the one provided in the 'free movement of workers' context.
We should begin by noting that the question of the compatibility with EU law of professional fees and tariffs set by national professional bodies is not really a hypothetical question, although it seems to us that the question has mostly arisen, and has thus been mostly addressed by the CJEU, in a 'free movement of services' context (i.e. when a professional was established in its country of origin and sought to provide temporary services in the Host MS) rather that in a 'freedom of establishment of (natural) course, the Host MS caould justify that restriction as an 'overriding requirement relating to the public interest'.
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This was an important precedent in respect of the application of the market access test to the free provision of services by self-employed professionals although, we would maintain, a non-conclusive one in respect of the field of 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons'. In fact, we would argue that the rationale advanced by the ECJ to justify the restriction of 'free movement of services' (FMS) by a minimum fee regime 46 could hardly apply to a situation where 'foreign' legal service providers are permanently established in the Host MS, in that the newly established foreign provider would be on a par with a newly established national provider, say a young solicitor trying to make himself known in the local national market.
However, in contrast with Cipolla, the more recent case of C-565/08, Commission v Italy ('lawyers maximum fees tariffs') 47 engaged with the issue of fees set by national legal professional bodies in respect of both 'free movement of services' and 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons', with the Commission explicitly arguing that Italy had 'adopted, in breach of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, provisions requiring lawyers to comply with maximum tariffs for the calculation of their fees'. 48 In this case, the Court ultimately ruled that the maximum fee tariffs were actually compatible with both 'freedom of establishment' and 'free movement of services', but it important to follow the Court's reasoning to appreciate what kind of principles are guiding its action. additional costs resulting from the application of the Italian system of fees, as well as to a reduction in profit margins and therefore a loss of competitiveness' 51 had no automatic purchase, and could only apply if those rules were demonstrably such as to deprive foreign service providers from accessing the market under conditions of 'effective competition', 52 which could not be suggested in that particular case as the Italian fees were sufficiently flexible to allow adequate remuneration for the various types of services provided by lawyers.
So to summarise this part of our analysis, the Court established in Cipolla that minimum fees for legal services set by a competent national body produce a restriction of free movement of services (FMS), and that -unless that restriction can be justified -foreign legal service providers ought to be allowed to charge lower fees for the sake of market penetration. The analysis in the 'maximum fees tariffs' case however clarified that while the Cipolla reasoning applied beyond the FMS context to the FES (presumably 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' and 'freedom of establishment of (legal) persons') one, maximum tariffs that did not impede effective competition, but simply produce 'a reduction in profit margins' 53 for foreign service providers, do not necessarily conflict with EU law.
On the basis of our analysis we can provisionally and tentatively conclude that our answer to the hypothetical question explored in this section of the article could be partly different from the one offered to the hypothetical question explored in the previous section. While the 'academic-employee' discussed above (in section 2(b)) would not be permitted to undercut wages collectively (or statutorily, for that matter) agreed within the Host MS for the sake of market penetration, it can not be ruled out that the CJEU may permit such an undercutting dynamic in the FES context, under the reasoning adopted in Cipolla. The latter judgment is of course a FMS cases, but the Court -regrettably, in our view -appears to have conflated the reasoning applying to FMS and FES cases in this domain, even though the 'lawyers maximum fee tariffs' case could be read as suggesting that when it does so it is a bit more attentive in assessing whether the domestic rule in the Host MS is sufficiently flexible, 54 
Free Movement of Services and the Posting of Workers
We have so far conceded, and given for granted, that 'free movement of services' (FMS) is anchored to the COP principle. But in this section we go on to illustrate a few key precedents 51 Ibid. Paragraphs 48. 52 Ibid. Paras 51-53. 53 Ibid. Paras 40 and 48. 54 As it was not found to be in the recent case Case C-475/11, Konstantinides (of 12 September 2013). and, in particular, we move on to analyse the Court's trajectory in the context of the posting of workers to suggest that the move to COP has been a partly the result of a slow process facilitated, if not triggered, by the Court's interpretation of the primary and secondary FMS provisions. In our view, the original approach of the Treaty of Rome in the FMS context was arguably at least partly reliant on the ETP as a (minimum) requirement of nondiscrimination, in that every service provider could 'temporarily pursue his activity in the State where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals'. 56 The Treaty also provided a (rather basic and non-exhaustive) list of types of services, such as activities of an industrial character, activities of a commercial character, activities of craftsmen, and activities of the professions. In this respect, it is important to recall the fairly obvious point that the notion, indeed the very understanding, of 'services' in 1957 must have been dramatically different from the one we have these days. The six founding MSs were predominantly industrial economies and the very idea of a 'service economy' would have appeared as rather fanciful. Unsurprisingly their appreciation of services was relatively narrow, and the idea that some services could have a significant cross-border dimension could not reflect our current, on-line era, understanding. Services, we would readily concede these days, are much more than the four examples mentioned in old Article 60 of the Treaty of Rome, and one could wonder if, in the era of the Carrefour, Amazon, Skanska, UBS, Group4S, and Vodaphone, that list reflects the realities of our service societies.
Eventually, the realities of a more complex services market caught up with the Treaty. In Rush Portuguesa, the Court found that a company established in one MS providing services in another MS must not be prevented from doing so by bringing its own workforce. It also noted however, at paragraph 16, that 'an undertaking engaged in the making available of labour, although a supplier of services within the meaning of the Treaty, [can carry] on activities which are specifically intended to enable workers to gain access to the labour market of the host Member State', and therefore, a Host 'Member States must in such a case be able to ascertain whether a [foreign] undertaking […] is not availing itself of the freedom to provide services for another purpose, for example that of bringing his workers for the purposes of placing workers or making them available'. 57 In these circumstances, and as long as the Host Member States actions were not such as to render free movement of services rights 'illusory', Community law did not preclude the host MS from extending their legislation or collective agreements 'to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which country the employer is established" nor from "enforcing those rules by appropriate measures". 58 The decision guaranteed service providers access to the host MS, but at the same time provided the latter with a possibility to impose ETP. 59 De Schutter has rightly noted that Rush 'was a source of considerable legal uncertainty at the time it was delivered, for it did not make clear which of the laws of the A decade later, the Court however started veering in the direction of COP. In Finalarte, for instance, it found that the Treaty did not preclude a host MS from imposing national rules guaranteeing entitlement to paid leave for posted workers, but only on the two-fold condition that (i) the workers do not enjoy an essentially similar level of protection under the law of the MS where the employer is established and (ii) that the application of those rules by the host MS is proportionate to the public interest objective pursued. 61 In Mazzoleni and Portugaia, the imposition of host country minimum wages was tolerated, but only insofar as they if, considered objectively, provided for the protection of posted workers.
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The adoption, in 1996, of the Posted Workers Directive (PWD), 63 sought to clarify the situation. A product of many compromises, it can be questioned whether it ever did. On the one hand, it introduced not just a possibility, but a duty to ensure that workers posted from other MS complied with and enjoyed host MS rules and treatment in a number of areas, thus bearing a number of ETP traits. On the other hand, it was never quite clear what would apply to areas of labour law outside of the list of areas referred to in Article 3(1) of the Directive. According to the wording of paragraph 13 of the Directive's Preamble, its provisions laid down a 'nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection', with Article 3(7) adding that this nucleus did 'not prevent application of terms and conditions of employment which are more favourable to workers'. The natural assumption, it seems, would have been to consider this Directive a 'minimum harmonization' type of instrument, and it was explicitly provided that its adoption was 'without prejudice to the law of the Member States concerning collective action to defend the interests of trades and professions'. 64 So it may not be inaccurate to describe the PWD as a mixed instrument in which dominant elements of ETP coexisted (perhaps unhappily) with some ECJ-backed features of 'managed mutual recognition' to use the expression coined by Nicolaïdis and Schmidt, 65 but as severely qualified by a robust, non-exhaustive, and 'minimum harmonization' list of mandatory requirements, contained mainly in Article 3(1).
As noted above however, Laval, and shortly thereafter Rüffert, changed the nature of the PWD by transforming it into a de-facto 'maximum' or 'exhaustive harmonization' instrument, and by anchoring it to the centrifugal force pulling 'free movement of services' (FMS) away from its original ETP and increasingly towards a MA with COP rationale. Oddly enough the same COP rationale that MEPs, and the European civil society, had opposed during the negotiations of the Service Directive, 66 but that the CJEU keeps pursuing through its interpretation of EU primary and secondary legislation in the FMS context. The move to the COP approach, we concede, has not been finalised yet, and MSs are to apply Article 3(1) of the PWD to extend the protections and rights of their domestic labour laws to posted workers. But the range of rights and their ability to enforce them is no doubt diminishing. Barnard has also noted the extent to which the interplay between this socially regressive and market oriented interpretation of the PWD by the CJEU and the Rome I Regulations can further limit the ability of Host MS to apply their domestic labour legislation to foreign service providers. In our view, none of these instruments challenge the reading that the CJEU has given to the PWD, effectively transforming it into a vehicle for the application of the COP in the cross-border provision of work related services.
In the following section we offer a critical analysis of the approach adopted by the CJEU against the spirit, if not also the letter, of the PWD, and offer a number of reasons why some areas of 'free movement of services' (as well as 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons') ought to be regulated by reference to the same principle underpinning 'free movement of workers', and in particular by reference to a strong 'equal treatment principle'.
5.
Breaking the 'free movement of services' monolith -the concept of 'personal work and services' in the 'free movement of services' context and the 'equal treatment principle'
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As mentioned in the previous section, the Treaty of Rome provided a conceptualisation of 'services' that was at best narrow and that, read in 2014, struggles to reflect a number of developments and nuances emerging from the progressive move of Western Europe towards an increasingly service oriented society. We conceded that, for all its limitations, that list also has some benefits and provided some relevant insights into the world of services, on which the CJEU has however failed to capitalise. The major benefit, for the purpose of our argument in this article, is that it offered an initial embryonic distinction between services provided by companies and services provided by persons, essentially activities of craftsmen and the professions. In spite of this important early intuition of the Treaty drafters, as noted in the previous section, not much has resulted in terms of an ad hoc set of rules applying in a distinct manner to personal service providers as opposed to corporate service providers. Cases like Laval and Commission v France seem to be premised on the same basic rationales underpinning judgments like Sager and Alpine Investments.
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So the regulation of 'free movement of services' (FMS) has developed as rather unitary 72 reflecting a rather monolithic understanding of services. We have contrasted this approach with the one adopted by the ECJ/CJEU, and described in section 2, in the free movement of workers context. We have also argued that the EU legislator, most visibly in the European Citizenship Directive, has identified some pockets of regulation of the 'freedom of establishment' area affecting self-employed persons and aligned them with the 'equal treatment principle' (ETP) rationale prevailing in the 'free movement of workers' context, although we noted that the Court's activity in the 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' area has sought to pull this area of EU law away from ETP and to anchor it increasingly to the 'country of origin principle' (COP) prevailing in the 'free movement of services' (FMS) context.
What we will argue in this section is that both the regulation of 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' and of some areas of FMS ought to be rebalanced in favour of the ETP principle prevailing in the 'free movement of workers' context to reflect the realities of modern labour and service markets, and the dignitarian concerns affect 21 st century Europe.
What we begin to propose in these pages is a different approach to the understanding of services, and one that builds on the original distinction between corporate and personal service providers in a more meaningful and purposive manner. We argue, admittedly against the current state of CJEU's case-law, that, firstly, the regulation of the freedom of establishment of self-employed professionals ought to be aligned to 'free movement of workers', as analysed above in section 3 of this article, to form a coherent area of 'Free movement of persons' law (FMP). And secondly, this time against the current state of both EU law and the Court's case law, that some service provision currently regulated along the lines of mainstream EU 'free movement of services' FMS law, should be carved out of this area of the law, and be allowed to follow the rules and rationales developed in the 'free movement of persons' context, to form a broader area of 'Free movement of personal work and service' providers (FMPWS). This by reason of either the fact that the provision of the services in question is mainly personal in character (and here the examples of the activities of craftsmen of the professions come to mind) or by reason of the fact that they involve the cross-border provision of a 'labour intensive' service, that is to say of a service where the cross-border movement of workforce from the home to the host MS constitutes the predominant element of the service provided.
We begin developing this argument by suggesting that, right from the establishment of the EEC, it was, or at least it should have been obvious, that not all services were identical and the cross-border provision of some services raised a number of issues and sensitivities that were similar to the ones raised by 'free movement of workers'. For instance, when discussing services, the Spaak Report highlighted the sensitivity of 'transport services' which were characterised by the fact that, almost by definition, 'they bring on the territory of another country the conditions of pay, cost, taxation, that prevail in another [country]'. 73 In our view this quote provides an early recognition of the fact that the provision of certain cross border services can entail a number of challenges for the host MSs that cannot be addressed merely by the respect and enforcement of 'the conditions and charges provided by the regulations in force in the country in question', 74 let alone by the adoption of a 'country of origin principle' (COP) test, and we like to see these concerns as an early warning of the problematic that, some fifty years later, materialised in the context of the Laval dispute and litigation, and that the 'equal treatment principle' (ETP) is best suited to address. For the purposes of our argument, 'transport services' ought to be seen as an example of a wider class of services in which are, by their nature, labour intensive and that ought to be treated by reference to the ETP rather than COP.
Needless to say, the concept of 'labour-intensive service' is unclear and debated. A good starting point however could be found by recognising as labour-intensive those services that the EU itself treats as such in the context of EU-VAT rules. We finish this section by tentatively suggesting that the PWD may have been originally conceived precisely to address some of the challenges arising from the provision of what we have termed here as personal and labour intensive services, although ultimately -partly because of its drafting, partly because of its interpretation by the Court -it has failed to do so. The Directive, while a 'free movement of services' instrument, was not dealing with any kind of services, but precisely with those services whose performance and delivery required the cross-border movement of workers. Undoubtedly, the fact that the workers were moving across the border to provide a service on a temporary basis, rather than a permanent one, meant that some of the 'free movement of workers' ETP requirements had to be suitably attuned. 79 But the idea that the integration in the Host MS was temporary is, we believe, quite different from the disingenuous suggestion that 'posted workers who are sent to another country to perform a service return to their country of origin after completing their mission, without at any time joining the labour market of the host Member State'. 80 Surely enough their participation in the host MSs labour market (and indeed in the Host MS tout-court) is of short duration, but there is no doubt in our mind about their joining, with a number of implications in terms of their displacement effect on alternatively available domestic labour. The more intellectually honest view is the one submitted by Commissioner Spidla noting that the PWD seeks 'to ensure the freedom to provide services and to prevent social dumping'. 
The Equal Treatment Principle -Protective or Protectionist?
As already remarked, the move away from the 'equal treatment principle (ETP) and in the direction of 'country of origin principle' (COP) as the governing principle for regulating 'free movement of services' (FMS) has been motivated by a desire to promote market access. Imposing ETP for the workers of foreign companies providing cross border services has been seen as hampering the trade in services and, as reported in the introduction, been equated to 'protectionism'. The proponents of the 'protection equals protectionism' axiom usually run their argument in two ways. Firstly, they argue that the additional administrative burden of having to comply with host country labour laws makes it ipso facto less attractive and more expensive for service providers to sell their services across borders. In addition they suggest that ETP deprives these service providers of their main competitive advantagelower unit labour costs.
Differences in unit labour costs are undoubtedly one of the drivers of trade today, not just trade in services but also trade in general, and trade in goods in particular. For instance companies will often relocate to countries where producing goods is relatively cheaper partly because of lower labour costs resulting in lower production costs. Even though the movement of production from one country to another sometimes generates protests, the purchasing of cheaper goods imported from other (low wage) countries is generally accepted, and indeed practiced, by most 'developed countries' consumer bases.
Economists tend to analyse trade in services in a similar way to trade in goods, or at least using trade-in-goods analogies. One such example, useful in the present context, is to make a distinction between traded goods (mainly manufactured goods) and non-traded goods (mainly services). 82 Technological change, allowing more and more services to be delivered at a distance, has turned many services that traditionally have been non-traded goods into traded goods. 83 Legal developments, such as the EU freedom to provide services and the GATS treaty, have further increased the range of tradable goods. From this perspective, arguing that different principles should guide the regulation of trade in goods and trade in services, or at least certain parts of the latter, may seem odd, in particular as trade theory has long seen the export of goods as a way of indirectly exporting labour. From this economic perspective, buying cheap goods from low wage countries, off-shoring services and allowing workers from other companies to cross borders to perform services at wagelevels that deviate from those in the country of work are comparable acts. Applying the ETP to one but not the others would thus be a double standard. 84 Playing devil's advocate, we could say that if we accept competition by means of unit labour costs in the case of trade in goods and for some services, why should it not be allowed in other areas?
This presupposes however, that trade in goods and commodities is the relevant term of comparison. As we have been submitting in this article, in the case of cross-border provisions of services including the posting of workers, an equally or more relevant term of comparison is 'free movement of workers'. The response to the rhetorical question above can therefore be another question: if we accept the equal treatment principle as the dominant regulatory principle in the case of 'free movement of workers', why should it not also apply to foreign workers performing exactly the same type of work and services as comparable domestic workers, with the only difference being the country of establishment of their employing company? Support for applying the ETP rather than the COP in the situations we describe can also be found in a number of 'market shaping' rationales. Labour law does not only set the standards for the relationship between employers and workers. It also sets standards for the competition between different employers and between different workers, as it regulates what means of competition can be used to compete for business and jobs. In the case of competition between firms, 'the ability of one firm to adopt a high-productivity route to competitive success is limited if its rivals are able to compete on the basis of low pay and poor working conditions'. 86 Labour law and social security set a floor under which wages and working conditions are not allowed to fall, forcing firms to improve and invest in product development, technology or management practices. Supiot, referring to the concept of 'l'égalité entre employeurs', points to placing different firms on an equal footing as concerns unit labour costs as one of the essential functions of labour law. 87 In the case of competition between workers, labour law works in essentially the same way, preventing underbidding and making it easier for workers to enter a high-productivity route, for example through investing in training. As Barnard has suggested in the context of EU free movement rules, this type of non-discriminatory labour laws should be understood as rules that merely 'structure the market', 88 and ought to be treated along the way of other rules, such as tax rules, seen as performing similar functions. 89 Providing, through the 'free movement of services' road, what in practical terms amounts to a possibility of avoiding host MS mandatory regulation is therefore highly problematic. It is particularly so when this can be combined with arrangements aimed at finding the tax and social security regimes that are most favourable to the employer. Furthermore, as already suggested, we do not believe that categorising the imposition of the ETP as protectionist per se is warranted. Clearly, the application of labour law has an effect on the demand for certain services. Actually, as we have just discussed, that is one of the things that it is supposed to do. The ETP does not exclude foreign service providers from the market, it merely requires that they follow the same rules as other actors in the market, establishing the aforementioned 'égalité entre employeurs'.
Finally, we believe that the argument that in the absence of 'a bit of dumping' the employees of foreign service providers would be even worse off, as they would have no work whatsoever, is deeply problematic. 91 It is as unconvincing as the argument that was often aired, in the 1970s and 1980s, against the introduction of equal pay laws -that 'equal pay legislation acts to the disadvantage of women and creates unemployment among them'. 92 Since the introduction of equal pay legislation women's labour market participation has only increased, and to the extent that women continue to suffer labour market disadvantages, the solution is unlikely to be found in more discrimination, but is likely to be achieved by taking equality issues seriously. Prior to Laval, the ECJ approach appeared to be more sympathetic to this kind of concern and reasoning, accepting the imposition of host MS labour law, at least as long as it, considered objectively, provided for the protection of posted workers. 93 In Wolf & Müller, a case in which the court upheld a German system for joint and several liability in the constructions sector, the referring court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) raised the issue whether the analysis of the protective intent of the measures should be affected by the fact that the 'protection … becomes less valuable economically if any real chance of obtaining employment in the Federal Republic of Germany is significantly reduced'. 94 The Court answered that 'it is none the less the case that a provision [such as the one in the main proceedings] benefits posted workers on the ground that, to the advantage of the latter, it adds to the primary obligant in respect of the minimum rate of pay, namely the employer, a further obligant who is jointly liable with the first debtor and is generally more solvent'. 'A weaker labour market due to higher costs will always be a risk with measures that are aimed to give increased social protection, regardless of whether it takes the form of hourly pay, overtime supplements or additional pay for work away from home. In my view it is self-evident that such supplements do not lose their character of objective advantage for the worker even when the increased cost run the risk of reducing the demand for the service in question.' 96 Phrased differently, the argument that an equal treatment guarantee applicable to workers posted to another MS would amount to protectionism and act against workers' interests (perhaps on the basis of a pseudo-Rawlsian reasoning that inequality is permissible to the extent that it can benefit the 'worse offs', a point that we feel adequately addressed by those arguing that 'equality is better for everyone ') 97 is closely related to the Epsteinian argument that labour law and social protection unduly interfere with the market and, as such, harm workers. 98 Even though the latter argument does have its proponents, it is far outside the mainstream debate in Europe and is hardly consistent with the 'social market economy' aspirations enshrined in the EU treaties.
Conclusions
The present article has advanced a simple yet highly contested argument, that is to say that certain types of cross border provisions covered by EU law on FMS should be regulated by reference to the 'equal treatment principle' (ETP), rather -as it is the case at present -than by reference to a 'market access' (MA) principle that increasingly leans towards a misguided 'country of origin principle' (COP). We have argued that ETP still plays a central role in the 'free movement of workers' context, in spite of the emergence of MA, and that this reflects the economic and dignitarian preoccupations underlying the creation of an internal market regulated by different sets of labour laws and standards and where labour is in free circulation. We have moved on to suggest that the area of 'freedom of establishment of (natural) persons' is contested between ETP based arguments (mostly put forward by the EU legislative institutions) and some COP elements (mostly endorsed by the CJEU), and that this are of EU free movement law ought to be more securely anchored to the 'equal treatment principle' regulating 'free movement of workers'. We have also put forward the more general argument that those trans-frontiers services that are characterised by their personal provision or by a certain degree of labour intensiveness ought to be regulated along the same lines of 'free movement of workers/persons', partly as a reflection of their sharing similar economic and dignitarian rationales. It seems to us that the current development of 'free movement of services' law and the general interpretation of the PWD run contrary to 96 these arguments, with EU law moving in a direction where the COP is the key regulatory principle.
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An application of the 'equal treatment principle' to the provision of personal and labour intensive services is more capable of taking into account the economic and dignitarian concerns that we have explored in this paper. It is suitably capable of ensuring market access by prohibiting any form of direct and indirect discrimination and acts as a market regulatory device that encourages economic and business models premised on productivity and investment in human capital, rather than the exploitation of cheap labour force. It does of course require the CJEU to look beyond the strict dichotomy of 'free movement of workers v free movement of services', and look behind the corporate veil of various trans-national provision of (labour intensive) services, to appreciate that what the various 'Lavals' are actually doing is to act as legal vehicles for the free (and unprotected) movement of migrant labourers. We do understand that this statement may come as an anathema to many. We draw some (limited) comfort from the fact that, in recent months, 
